In June 2026, a judge in Riverhead, New York, sentenced Rex Heuermann, a Manhattan architectural consultant, to life without parole for a string of murders that terrorised Long Island for more than a decade. He was connected to the deaths through DNA evidence and phone records and was arrested in 2023, and in April 2026 he pleaded guilty to killing eight women whose bodies were dumped along Gilgo Beach between the 1990s and roughly 2010. It is one of the only cases in recent memory that fits the classic, lurid template of the American serial killer, and the fact that it took genetic evidence and a cell phone trail to close it, rather than old fashioned legwork, is exactly the point. There is no law on the books, federal or state, that formally defines a serial killer. The most widely used definition comes out of a multidisciplinary symposium convened by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which settled on the unlawful killing of two or more victims by the same offender in separate events, at different times, and deliberately dropped older requirements for a minimum of three victims or a cooling off period between crimes. Since the government does not keep an official count, the job has fallen to academics. The most cited resource is the Radford/FGCU Serial Killer Database, a project a Radford University psychology professor began building by hand in 1992 that has grown into the largest non-governmental database of its kind, tracking thousands of offenders and more than eleven thousand victims across the world. What that database and the criminologists who mine it agree on is stark. Serial homicide was not a constant feature of American life. It surged through the 1970s and peaked in the 1980s, a decade researchers estimate produced roughly 770 active serial killers in the United States, a number that dwarfs anything before or since. Peer reviewed research published in the journal Cogent Social Sciences found that the most recent decade studied contained barely half the share of cases that existed at that 1980s peak, roughly thirteen percent of the historical total compared with twenty seven percent concentrated in the eighties alone. Whatever produced Ted Bundy, John Wayne Gacy and the Green River Killer, it was a phenomenon of a particular moment, and that moment has passed. The timeline for genetic forensics does not line up neatly with that decline, and this is where the tidy DNA narrative starts to wobble. The FBI's Combined DNA Index System, known as CODIS, began life as a pilot software project in 1990 serving just fourteen state and local laboratories. The DNA Identification Act of 1994 gave the Bureau formal authority to build a National DNA Index System, but the index was not activated until October 1998, and even then it launched with only eight states contributing profiles before expanding nationwide. By the time CODIS was a functioning national tool in the early 2000s, the serial killer decline that criminologists point to was already well underway, having started its downward slide more than a decade earlier. DNA did not arrive in time to have caused the initial collapse in numbers, whatever role it has played since. Criminologists offer a menu of competing, and probably complementary, explanations for what actually happened. Northeastern University's James Alan Fox, who has studied the phenomenon for decades, points to a simple loss of opportunity: people stopped hitchhiking, parents got more protective, and the pool of easily isolated, trusting strangers that killers like Bundy exploited largely dried up. Fox has also told Northeastern Global News that surveillance cameras and cellphones' GPS (Global Positioning System) tracking capabilities make it harder for serial killers to abduct victims in the first place, a mundane technological shift with an outsized effect. Fox and his frequent co-author Jack Levin have separately argued that the explosive growth of the American prison population from the 1980s onward may have taken potential offenders off the streets before they ever escalated. None of these explanations require DNA to do any work at all. The cleanest version of the decline story also runs into a stubborn complication: clearance rates for homicide have been falling, not rising, for decades. The Murder Accountability Project, founded by former journalist Thomas Hargrove, has tracked FBI figures showing that only fifty one percent of homicides were solved in 2021, down from a historical clearance rate closer to seventy percent. Hargrove's organisation attributes the slide to a failure to give necessary resources to local police and a failure of political will by elected leaders to prioritise major crime investigations. If fewer murders are being solved overall, some unknown fraction of what looks like a decline in serial killers may really be a decline in the ability to link scattered killings to a single offender in the first place, not a decline in the killing itself. Meanwhile, genetic genealogy, a distinct and much newer technique from routine CODIS matching, keeps reopening cases that were written off as unsolvable. Investigators have used it to identify cold case victims and suspects decades after the fact, including a Pennsylvania case that took fifty eight years to crack and, as recently as July 2026, the identification of a cold case victim known as Chelsea Jane Doe after nearly twenty six years. A Chevy Chase, Maryland, murder from 2001 sat unresolved for more than two decades before genetic genealogy pointed investigators to a suspect. Each of these solves is technically a decades-old serial or single killer being retroactively confirmed, which means the historical statistics criminologists rely on are still being revised upward in real time, long after the fact.